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Abstract 
Over the years, the United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping operations have 
increased significantly. When a crisis develops in any part of the world, the UN is 
expected to respond. It examines the overall situation in order to assess the political 
and military goals, required composition of force, equipment, training, financial 
implications, circumstances of deployment and effectiveness of the peacekeeping 
operation required. The UN does not have any permanent force structure; it is 
dependent on its member States for contribution of forces, though the equipment 
may or may not be provided by the troops’ contributing countries. The UN has a 
standard procedure for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services. The process is 
a contract between the United Nations’ Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNDPKO) and the troops’ contributing countries. Though there are similarities 
between UN-followed contract management process and the generally accepted 
contract management process identified in the contract management body of 
knowledge, there are many differences as well. The purpose of this study is to both 
evaluate the existing UN contract management process being followed to acquire 
peacekeeping operation/services from various troops’ contributing countries against 
the generally accepted contract management process identified in the contract 
management body of knowledge as well as to evaluate the contract management 
process maturity so as to assess the effectiveness of the UN contract management 
process for obtaining peacekeeping operations/services from troops’ contributing 
countries. 
Keywords: Acquisition, Analysis, Contract, Contract Management, Contract 
Management Maturity Model, Contract Management Maturity Assessment Tools, 
Evaluation, Force Generation Service, Maturity Level, Peacekeeping Operations, 
Ratings, Structure, Troops’ Contributing Countries, United Nations, United Nations 
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Executive Summary 
The primary purpose of UN peacekeeping operations is to maintain 
international peace and security. Its success continues to depend, to a significant 
degree, on the ability to acquire necessary personnel (uniformed and civilian) and 
weapon/equipment systems and to deploy them rapidly. The acquisition and 
deployments of troop contingents for peacekeeping operations are done following 
mechanisms known as Memorandum of Understanding/Letter of Assist. The United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for the overall 
contract management process, starting from concept development to termination of 
the mission. The process followed is more or less standardized for almost all 
peacekeeping operation planning and acquiring peacekeeping operations/services, 
though at times changes are made to accommodate certain political and security 
considerations, and willingness of host countries, UN and its member countries. 
Additionally, the contract management process maturity assessment is essential to 
understand the process’s effectiveness. Specifically, the application of the Contract 
Management Maturity Model and its subsequent analysis determines the overall 
contract management maturity level of the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services. The 
analysis also highlights the weaknesses in various areas of contract management 



























One of the founding missions of the United Nations (UN) was to prevent the 
scourge of war between States. With time, the international community has largely 
realized that goal. However, while inter-State war has become a relatively rare 
aberration, threats to human security have by no means been eradicated. Savage 
civil wars still persist. Recent experience has shown that the quest for international 
peace and security requires complementary action on two fronts: on the security 
front, where victory spells freedom from fear, and on the economic and social front, 
where victory spells freedom from want. Human security and equitable and 
sustainable development turn out to be two sides of the same coin.  
UN peacekeeping clearly offers certain unique advantages not to be found 
elsewhere, including the universality of its mandate and the breadth of its 
experience. The perpetual preparedness of the Security Council—ready to authorize 
new peacekeeping operations whenever, and for as long as, they may be needed—
not only strengthens the United Nations’ conflict-prevention efforts, but also assists 
its wider peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building endeavors. 
Fifty years after the establishment of the first UN peacekeeping operation, the 
number of current UN peacekeeping operations is 16; six of these are in Europe, 
four in the Middle East, four in Africa, two in Asia and one in the Americas with some 
87,707 military and police personnel deployed in missions around the globe (Ban-Ki-
Moon, 2007, January 7). Since peacekeeping continues to be adapted to changing 
needs and situations, the total number of peacekeepers in the field varies; several 
United Nations operations wind down while other missions open up. 
Over the years, the UN peacekeeping operations have increased significantly. 
When a crisis develops in any part of the world, the UN is expected to respond. It 
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required composition of force, equipment, training, financial implications, 
circumstances of deployment and effectiveness of the peacekeeping operation 
required. The UN does not have any permanent force structure. When it decides to 
initiate peacekeeping operation, it obtains forces and/or services/equipment from 
Troops’ Contributing Countries (TCCs) following a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) or Letter of Assist (LOA). This is a unique contract procedure—one not in 
place in the public procurement/contracting system or commercial 
procurement/contracting system worldwide. Though the UN-followed contract 
management process for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services is similar to 
the contract management process identified by the contract management body of 
knowledge, there are many differences as well. Despite the well-established nature 
of the process, not much evaluation of this contract management process has been 
documented.  
For future improvement of performance of peacekeeping operations, it is 
essential to analyze the performance of the contract management process being 
followed to acquire peacekeeping operations/services. Applying the Contract 
Management Maturity Model (CMMM), this paper endeavors to evaluate the maturity 
of the contract management process being followed in the UN for acquiring 
peacekeeping operations/services.  
B. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The purpose of this research is to study the United Nations’ contract 
management process for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services. The primary 
research questions of this project are: 
a. What is the UN contract policy, process or system for acquiring 
peacekeeping operations/ services? 
b. What is the extent of similarity or dissimilarity of the UN contract 
management process with the generally accepted contract 
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c. How effective is the UN contract management process for acquiring 
peacekeeping operations/services? 
d. How mature is the contract management process of acquiring 
peacekeeping operations/services?  
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY  
1. Scope 
The methods and machinery for preventing or controlling conflicts have taken 
many forms—peacekeeping operations, observation missions, fact-finding missions, 
supervision of plebiscites, missions of good offices, conciliation panels, mediators 
and special representatives, etc. Peacekeeping missions are not the UN’s only 
presence in conflict zones. Field staff of UN entities, among them the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food 
Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), often work closely with peacekeepers. In addition, 
peacekeepers have been called upon to support the activities of non-governmental 
and other organizations engaged in providing humanitarian assistance to victims of 
conflicts. However, for ease of understanding and volume of work, this paper deals 
with only the contract procedure related to the many military aspects of 
peacekeeping operations.  
2. Methodology 
This research project is a study of the contract management process being 
followed in the UN for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services from troops’ 
contributing countries (TCCs). A literature review of the generally accepted contract 
management process as identified in the contract management body of knowledge 
will be conducted to analyze this process and how it relates to the UNDPKO’s (as 
receiver) acquisition planning, solicitation process, source selection and evaluation, 
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and TCC’s (as provider) contribution planning, bid/no-bid decision, proposal 
preparation, contract negotiation and formation, contract administration and contract 
closeout. Thereafter, the UN peacekeeping contract management process will be 
evaluated using the CMMM developed jointly by Gregory A. Garrett and Dr. Rene G 
Rendon. Use of CMMM will also include interviews of key personnel in the UN 
peacekeeping contract management process and survey. 
D. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The role and authority of multinational peace operations in today’s complex 
political world pose important legal and policy issues for the international community 
(Sharp, 1995, p. XIX). Any UN peacekeeping operation begins with an agreement or 
contract between the warring factions of a country or countries, the UN and the 
TCC(s). The peacekeeping operation is very diverse, changes with country, 
situation, time and stakeholders. Thus, the contract management process becomes 
extremely complex and time-consuming. The results of this study can provide both 
internal and external stakeholders a useful framework for understanding/evaluating 
the contract management process followed in the UN for acquiring peacekeeping 
operations/services. An evaluation of these contract management processes using 
CMMM will both give a clear understanding of contract management process 
maturity as well as act as an ideal analytical tool both for the UN and the TCC. An 
understanding of the UN contract management process is fundamental to the proper 
planning and execution of a successful peacekeeping operation.  It is well 
understood that generally accepted contract management process identified in the 
contract management body of knowledge and the UN contract management process 
will have many dissimilarities; still, this study is expected to provide an important 
image of UN’s contract management process, its organization, strategy, working 
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH 
The following chapters form the complete study on the UN contract 
management process for peacekeeping operations/services. Chapter I introduces 
the research paper—giving background, purpose, research questions, scope and 
methodology, benefits of the research and organization of the paper. Chapter II 
highlights UN peacekeeping operations, which is followed by a literature review on 
the contract management process for acquiring the UN peacekeeping 
operations/services in Chapter III. Chapter IV presents an evaluation of the UN 
contract management process against generally accepted contract management 
process identified in the contract management body of knowledge; the study then 
applies the Contract Management Maturity Model to assess the contract 
management maturity of the UN contract management process for acquiring 
peacekeeping operations. Finally, Chapter V gives research implications and 
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II. UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS/SERVICES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter introduced the research paper—giving background, 
purpose, research questions, scope and methodology, benefits of the research and 
organization of the paper. This chapter will explain UN peacekeeping 
operations/services, UN peacekeeping policy/strategy, the way UN peacekeeping 
operations are established, the role of the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO), types of peacekeeping operations, legal authority for 
peacekeeping operations, and financing methods. 
B. UN PEACEKEEPING—GENERAL 
1. Definition 
UN Peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto 
with the consent of all parties concerned, and normally involving the UN’s military 
and/or police personnel and (frequently) civilians, as well. “Peace keeping is a 
technique that expands all possibilities for both prevention of conflict and the making 
of peace” (Sharp, 1995, p. 27). Basically, it is the duty of military personnel or forces 
in a country or countries to perform traditionally non-military functions (or military 
functions, if a mandate is received from the Security Council) in an impartial manner. 
These functions might include supervision of a cessation of hostilities agreement or 
truce, observation or presence, interposition between opposing forces as a buffer 
force, maintenance and patrol of a border, or removal of arms in the area. However, 
with the passage of time, UN peacekeeping operations have evolved from being 
mostly non-military functions to including military functions.  
The first peacekeeping operation mission established by the UN was an 
observer mission, The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), set up in the 
Middle East in June 1948. Other observer missions were set up following the same 
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C. UN PEACEKEEPING POLICY/STRATEGY 
1. Peacekeeping Principles 
UN peacekeeping is based on the principle that an impartial presence on the 
ground can ease tensions between hostile parties and create space for political 
negotiations. Peacekeeping can help bridge the gap between the cessation of 
hostilities and a durable peace, but only if the parties to a conflict have the political 
will needed to reach the goal. Initially developed as a means of dealing with inter-
State conflict, UN peacekeeping has increasingly been used in intra-State conflicts 
and civil wars, which are often characterized by multiple armed factions with differing 
political objectives and fractured lines of command. These realities have, particularly 
since the late 1980s, led to an evolution in the structure of peacekeeping missions. 
The UN Security Council normally establishes peacekeeping operations in 
keeping with certain basic principles: 
a. Impartiality: i.e., peacekeepers must be impartial between parties, 
b. Consent and cooperation: i.e., peacekeeping operations could be 
established only with the consent of the parties to the conflict in 
question,  
c. Appropriate use of force, 
d. Unity and international character,  
e. Respect for principles of international humanitarian law, and respect 
for local laws and customs. (Goulding, 2007, p. 453; Peacekeeping 
Best Practices Unit, 2003, December, p. 55) 
There are also a few other principles which are considered before planning a 
mission, which include agreement and continuing support by the Security Council, 
unrestricted access and freedom of movement by the operation within the countries 
of operation and within the parameters of its mandate, provision of personnel and/or 
equipment on a voluntary basis by UN members, and non-interference by the 
operation and its participants in the internal affairs of the host government (GAO, 
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“traditional” model of a military operation deployed in support of a political activity. 
These operations involve military tasks such as monitoring ceasefires and patrolling 
buffer zones between hostile parties and are carried out by UN peacekeepers who 
may or may not be armed and who are widely known as "blue helmets" or "blue 
berets" because of their distinctive headgear. Although past military observer 
missions have also included non-military tasks, a growing number of UN 
peacekeeping operations have become multidimensional, composed of a range of 
components, including military, civilian police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, 
human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and troops’gender. 
Some of these operations do not have a military component but carry out their 
mandates alongside a regional or multinational peacekeeping force.  
Depending on their mandate, multidimensional peacekeeping operations 
(also referred to as peace operations) may be required to (Peacekeeping Best 
Practices Unit, 2003, December, p. 10):  
a. Assist in implementing a comprehensive peace agreement, 
b. Monitor a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities to allow space for political 
negotiations and a peaceful settlement of disputes, 
c. Provide a secure environment encouraging a return to normal civilian 
life,  
d. Prevent the outbreak or spill-over of conflict across borders,  
e. Lead States or territories through a transition to stable government 
based on democratic principles, good governance and economic 
development, and  
f. Administer a territory for a transitional period, thereby carrying out all 
the functions that are normally the responsibility of a government.  
Since 1948, the UN has launched 60 peacekeeping operations, out of which 
16 are currently active; six of these are in Europe, four in the Middle East, four in 
Africa, two in Asia and one in the Americas. Till the end of the Cold War, the number 
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after the end of the Cold War, as the number of peacekeeping missions started to 
increase, so did expenditures. Then, in the mid-1990s, there was a steady decline. 
After that, the number of UN peacekeeping missions increased steadily. Over the 
years, peacekeeping has come to constitute more than just the placement of military 
forces into a cease-fire situation with the consent of all the parties. Military 
peacekeepers may be disarming or seizing weapons, aggressively protecting 
humanitarian assistance, and clearing land mines. Presently, peacekeeping 
operations have expanded non-military tasks such as maintaining law and order 
(police), election monitoring, and human rights monitoring. The following tables give 
an idea of the trend of UN peacekeeping operations and expenditure through 2006 
(UN, n.d.). 
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Figure 2.2. UN Expenditure for Peacekeeping from 1986 to 2006 
D. ESTABLISHING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Peacekeeping operations are established by the Security Council, which is, 
under the UN Charter, the organization with “primary responsibility for international 
peace and security.” In each case, a new mission must be designed and its 
components assembled to meet the requirements of that particular situation. Since 
the UN has no standing army or police force, this requires that the Organization 
generate troops and civilian police from Member States and recruit international and 
national civilian staff, as required by the mission’s mandate. There is no set 
sequence of events leading to the establishment of a peacekeeping operation, but in 
most cases, some combination of the following events occurs (Peacekeeping Best 
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1. Consultations/Peace Agreements 
As a particular conflict develops or intensifies, or as the hostile parties 
approach agreement on a negotiated settlement, ongoing consultations take place 
among Member States, the Secretariat, the parties on the ground, States in the 
region concerned and countries that are potential contributors of troops, police and 
other resources, regarding the possible need for a UN presence and the shape the 
settlement might take. It is particularly critical that the parties concerned provide 
consent for UN involvement. Often, one or more of the parties will insist, as a 
precondition for signing the peace agreement, on a UN role in verifying compliance 
with or helping to implement the agreement. As such, peace agreements often 
define the contours of any future UN operation; and the UN can provide, during the 
negotiations phase, valuable advice as to the kind of mandate that the UN would be 
able to implement—based on its capacity, expertise and previous experience—
should the Security Council agree to authorize such a mandate. Early and ongoing 
consultation with the Security Council and other Member States is essential to 
ascertain if they are prepared to support the course of action envisaged for the UN 
and to provide the resources required to do the job.  
2. Technical Assessment Mission 
As soon as security conditions permit, an integrated technical assessment 
mission involving the relevant UN departments, funds and programs travels to the 
country or territory where the mission is to be established to assess the overall 
security, political, humanitarian, human rights and military situation on the ground 
and the implications for a UN operation.  
3. Report of the Secretary General 
The Secretary General makes recommendations to the Security Council, 
taking into account the findings and recommendations of the technical assessment 
mission, on the options for establishing a peacekeeping operation, including its size 
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4. Security Council Resolution 
The Security Council passes a resolution authorizing the operation’s 
deployment and determining its size and mandate. (Such decisions require at least 
nine out of 15 votes in favor and are subject to a veto by any of the Council's five 
permanent members: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom 
and the United States). The budget and resources of the missions is then subject to 
General Assembly approval.  
5. Appointment of Senior Official 
The Secretary General appoints a senior official, preferably a serving and 
well-reputed and recognized officer in the UN, to head the operation.  
6. Planning 
In the meantime, planning for political, military, operational and support (i.e., 
logistics and administration) aspects of the peacekeeping operation is ongoing, with 
the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) (or other senior official) 
and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the lead. The Military 
Planning Service (MPS), in consultation with the Military Division of the DPKO, is 
responsible for preparing the Strategic Estimate, Concept Operations, Command 
Directive, determination of Force Requirement and Rules of Engagement of the 
peacekeeping force (MPS Official, 2007, February 6). The planning phase usually 
involves the establishment of a Headquarters-based joint working group or 
integrated mission task force (IMTF), with participation of all relevant UN 
departments, funds and programs. The following diagram shows detailed planning 
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Figure 2.3. Planning Process for UN Peacekeeping Operations 
7. Contribution of Troops and Other Resources 
Member States are asked to contribute military troops and civilian police, if 
required, as well as supplies, equipment, transportation and logistical support.  
8. Deployment 
Deployment proceeds as quickly as possible—taking into account the security 
and political conditions on the ground—often starting with an advance team to 
establish mission headquarters and leading to a gradual build-up to encompass all 
components and regions, as required by the mandate.  
9. Reporting and Review 
The Secretary General reports regularly to the Security Council concerning 
the activities of the operation. The Security Council renews and adjusts the mission’s 
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diagrams highlight the chain of events in the establishment process of a complex UN 
peacekeeping operations (Durch, 2001, October, p. 13). 
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E. ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS 
The UN is a key enabler to avoiding, containing and resolving disputes. 
Leaving aside its work on economic, social and humanitarian matters (and indeed 
even on arms control and disarmament negotiation), it has had to act on the basis of 
certain prescriptions in the UN charters; it is charged with the promotion and 
development of international law; it has a role in the settlement of disputes, and it is 
intended to play a central role in the provision of collective security. 
Peacekeeping operations, traditionally, were mostly military operations with 
limited political goals and tasks. Consequently, they were generally placed under the 
supervision of a Force Commander, with any political functions directed from UN 
Headquarters. However, given the nature of the new generation of multidisciplinary 
peacekeeping operations and the need for rapid decision-making in the field in the 
areas of considerable political sensitivity, these new missions were placed under the 
overall supervision of a Special Representative of the Security General (SRSG) to 
whom both military and civilian components reported. The increasing use of SRSGs 
endowed peacekeeping operations with greater political mediation capability infield. 
In addition SRSGs are able to communicate direct country-specific requirements to 
UNHQ. In this way, SRSGs are able to spearhead, in many instances, the 
consolidation of peace at the local level.   
The DPKO, which was established as a separate department of the UN 
Secretariat in 1992, is responsible for planning, managing, deploying, supporting 
and, on behalf of the Secretary General, providing executive direction to all UN 
peacekeeping operations (Wikipedia, 2007, January). It also performs similar 
functions in support of peace and security operations that are predominantly civilian, 
such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The DPKO 
works very closely with the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which is the focal 
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standard organizational structure for UN PKO is given in the figure below (UN, 
2007a).  
 
Figure 2.7. Organization Structure for UN Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNDPKO, 2006) 
F. TYPES OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
There are three types of peace operations: traditional peacekeeping, peace-
building, and peace enforcement or making, the details of which are given below 
(Gantz, 2006, August, p. 1):  
1. Peacekeeping 
This is a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade 
from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force 
separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many 
elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous 
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aftermath of civil wars. Traditional peacekeeping missions, in which usually the UN 
peacekeepers (and at times outside military forces like regional force or security 
alliances) are interposed between the former warring parties, have generally been 
successful when the parties are genuinely engaged in and committed to the peace 
process. The UN peacekeepers prevent accidents or mitigate the consequences of 
accidents, but cannot force parties to engage in the peace process. 
2. Peace-building 
This is also known as nation building (or more accurately, State building), 
which tries to ensure that the peace process is sustainable and long-lasting. Today’s 
complex, multidimensional peace operations—which take a holistic approach to 
establishing security and the rule of law and which strengthen the political and 
economic management capacity of governments in weak or failed States—are 
examples of peace-building efforts. These sorts of operations can follow the 
integrated mission model (in which all parts of the UN system are supposed to be 
working together) or feature executive authority (in which the UN administers 
significant parts of the country/territory and hands over to local control as local 
capacity becomes capable of effective management). This is what the UN is trying to 
do in places such as Haiti, Liberia, and Kosovo. 
3. Peace Enforcement or Peacemaking 
This process addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a 
halt using the tools of diplomacy, mediation and or force. Peacemakers may be 
envoys of Governments, groups of States, regional organizations or the UN, or they 
may be unofficial and non-governmental groups (as was the case, for example, in 
the negotiations leading up to a peace accord for Mozambique). Peacemaking may 
even be the work of a prominent personality, working independently.  
Again, peace enforcement operations, in which a peace process is imposed 
on the warring parties by outside military forces, are difficult, costly, and require 
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conjunction with robust rules of engagement is difficult both for troop-contributing 
countries and the UN itself, the UN seldom engages in these sorts of operations. In 
fact, peace enforcement by the UN has often been unsuccessful.  The exceptions 
are cases in which there was strong unity and support for the mission within the 
international community, such as in East Timor and Eastern Slovenia, or cases in 
which the use of force was handed off to a military organization, such as in 
Kosovo—which relies on NATO military forces for the peace enforcement 
component of peace operations.  
G. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
Two key charters of the UN provide the legal authority for the Security Council 
to maintain international peace and security. Chapter VI provides for the “Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes” (UN, 2006a). This chapter requires the parties to any 
dispute that may endanger international peace and security to “seek a solution by 
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to 
regional arrangement or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Within this 
peaceful settlement mechanism, the Security Council has investigative powers and 
the authority to recommend “appropriate procedures or methods of adjustments.” 
Chapter VI peace operations rely upon the consent of the parties involved and are 
intended to be impartial in nature.  As defined by the Secretary General of UN in his 
Agenda for Peace, these consensual peace operations include preventive 
deployment, peace-making, and peacekeeping operations and are normally 
conducted under the control of the Secretary General. If diplomacy or Chapter VI 
measures fail to restore or maintain international peace and security, Chapter VII 
authorizes UN Security Council to employ coercive force. Article 39 provides that the 
“Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the 
peace, or an act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
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H. FINANCING METHOD FOR UN PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS 
All Member States share the costs of UN peacekeeping operations. The 
General Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of 
assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account the relative 
economic wealth of Member States, with the permanent members of the Security 
Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. As of 1 January 2007, the top 10 
providers of assessed contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations 
were: the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, China, 
Canada, Spain and the Republic of Korea (UN, 2006b). Many countries have also 
voluntarily made additional resources available to support UN peacekeeping efforts 
on a non-reimbursable basis in the form of transportation, supplies, personnel and 
financial contributions above and beyond their assessed share of peacekeeping 
costs. 
Basic financial issues relating to peacekeeping are considered by the General 
Assembly under the agenda item, “Administrative and budgetary aspects of the 
financing of the UN peacekeeping operations” (UN, 2006a). The Finance 
Management Services (FMS) and Peacekeeping Finance Department (PFD) are 
responsible for formulation and management of budget requirements of individual 
peacekeeping missions. The first stage of the budget process is production of the 
addendum to SG’s report to the Security Council, which covers the financial 
implications of the operation. In most cases, the mandate period is six months. The 
total cost provided in the financial implications serves as the ceiling which detailed 
cost estimates cannot exceed when submitted at a later date for General Assembly’s 
(GA) approval. Once the financial implications have been submitted, a detailed 
budget is prepared for presentation to the GA to obtain funds for the mission. Due to 
the long lead-time required for a mission to be established by the UN (up to six 
month from establishing the mission to budget approval), a financing mechanism is 
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requirement. This mechanism is done by way of a “Request for Commitment 
Authority,” which has the authority to approve up to US $50million without requiring 
5th Committee approval (UN, 2001, September, p. E-2). 
I. SUMMARY 
This chapter highlighted UN peacekeeping operations/services, UN 
peacekeeping policy/strategy, the way peacekeeping operations are established, the 
role of the UNDPKO, types of peacekeeping operations, legal authority for 
peacekeeping operations, and the financing methods followed in UN for 
peacekeeping operations. The next chapter will give the literature review of the 
contract management process followed by the UN. Specifically, this chapter will 
identify and discuss the following UN contract management process: contract 
planning, contract elements, contract types, legal framework, contents of standard 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW ON CONTRACT 
MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter explained UN peacekeeping operations/services, UN 
peacekeeping policy/strategy, the way peacekeeping operations are established, the 
role of the UNDPKO, types of peacekeeping operations, legal authority for 
peacekeeping operations, and financing methods. This chapter will give the literature 
review of the contract management process followed by the UN. Specifically, this 
chapter will identify and discuss the following UN contract management process: 
contract planning, contract elements, contract types, legal framework, contents of 
standard MOUs and LOAs and the application of contract principles.  
B. DEFINITION OF CONTRACT 
A contract is a relationship between buyer and seller defined by an 
agreement about their respective rights and responsibilities. In other words, 
contracts define an agreed-on relationship between a buyer and seller. Generally, 
contracts are written documents containing words, numerals, symbols and perhaps 
drawings to describe a relationship(s) between contracting parties (Garrett, 2003, p. 
52). The written documents have Clauses and Terms and Conditions. A contract 
consists of a series of statements called clauses. Clauses are short and normally 
easy to understand. Collectively, clauses form the terms and conditions of the 
contract; ideally, they define the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the 
contract. A term is simply a part of the contract. In the context of contracts for 
peacekeeping operations/services, the contract is a document that describes an 
agreement about rights and responsibilities. Both in the commercial world and in the 
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C. ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT 
Typically, in order to be enforceable, a contract must have the following 
elements: 
a. Mutual consent, 
b. Offer and acceptance, 
c. Mutual consideration (the mutual exchange of something of value), 
d. Performance or delivery, 
e. Good faith, and 
f. No violation of public policy. (“Expert Law,” 2007) 
The contracts for peacekeeping operations/services have these same 
elements, though they are subject to additional rules, regulations and policies.  
D. CONTRACT TYPES FOR ACQUIRING PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS 
Contrary to the procedure followed in the commercial world, the contract type 
followed by the UN is aimed at providing needed flexibility in acquiring peacekeeping 
operations and services. Contract types vary according to the degree of urgency and 
responsiveness of both the UN and the troops’ contributing country (TCC).  The 
generally followed practice is basically awarding negotiated contract, either 
competitive or noncompetitive. There are two types of negotiated contracts, sole-
source and competitive. In the UN, the contract for peacekeeping operations are 
done in a competitive environment (unique to the UN), though the procedures are 
tailored to suit the UN system so as to minimize complexity of the solicitation, 
evaluation, and source-selection process. It maintains a process designed to foster 
an impartial and comprehensive evaluation of the UNDPKO’s requirement against 
the TCC’s proposals, leading to selection of the proposal representing the best value 
to the UN. However, the reimbursements both for troops/contingents and specialized 
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The UN peacekeeping operations are performed by deploying contingents of 
troops in the mission areas. This process can be defined as a service rendered by 
troop contingents. This acquiring of peacekeeping operations/services is done 
following a contract between the UNDPKO and the TCC. For the deployment of 
contingents—with the integral weapons systems and equipments—the contract is a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).  
When the contingents need specialized weapons or equipments, there are 
two ways through which such equipment/weapon systems are acquired. For 
example, if the mission needs aircraft, one way is to acquire them through 
commercial means. The process occurs after the Force Generation Service (FGS) 
receives a Concept of Operations from the Military Planning Service (MPS). The 
FGS then carries out an assessment (in consultation with the MPS) of its 
requirement of what type of aircraft, number of aircraft, area of deployment, specific 
load capacity, crew requirement, support requirement, etc. After determining all 
these specifications (generally performance), the FGS prepares an Invitation to Bid 
(ITB) and sends it to Procurement Service at UNHQ, which issues an Expression of 
Interest. The UN-registered commercial contractors participate in the bidding 
process. After they receive offers from prospective suppliers, the FGS carries out a 
technical evaluation against the mission requirement. After the technical evaluation, 
the FGS sends those bids to the commercial department for financial evaluation. 
After technical and commercial evaluation of all prospective bids, Headquarters 
Committee on Contract in the UN approves the contract. After the approval, the FGS 
signs the contract on behalf of the UN.   
The second way to acquire the specialized equipment or weapon system is 
from the TCC. The contract management process for acquiring specialized 
equipment or weapon systems is similar to the process followed for acquiring troop 
contingents. However, in this case, in addition to the MOU, a separate Letter of 
Assist (LOA) is signed between the UNDPKO and the TCC. Both the contracts are 
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previously mentioned, the signing processes of MOUs and LOAs are similar. The 
flow chart of the contract management process is given in the following table (SOP, 
2001, February). 
 
Figure 3.1. Force-generation Process: Flow Chart of Signing of MOU/LOA 
(UNDPKO, 2007, February 6) 
E. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
There is no universal law of contracts. Some countries adopt a statutory or 
civil law system; others are governed by common law. Civil law is that body of law 
created by acts of legislature; common laws comprise a body of principles and rules 
of action that derive their authority not from legislative enactments but from usages 
and customs or from judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming and 
enforcing such usages and customs.  Commercial sales are governed currently by 
statutes even in most common-law countries. A sale is a contract pursuant to whose 
terms goods are transferred from seller to buyer. Although the law of sale is based 
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on the same principles applicable to other contracts, it has developed certain 
specialized aspects concerning the rights and obligations arising from the transfer of 
goods. For example, in the USA, a contract for sale of goods will be subject to the 
statute called the Unified Commercial Code (UCC) (Garrett, 2003, p. 45).  
Commercial contracting law allows organizations to form contracts based on 
generally accepted notions of commercial reasonableness (Free Dictionary, 2007). 
In essence, the law allows each side to rely on the other's presence to establish 
authority to make a binding contract. Of course, there are many nuances and cases 
covering this, but, generally, the law favors the creation of commercial contracts in 
order to facilitate business. However, the UN has its own laws for conduct and 
implementation of contracts between itself and the TCC for peacekeeping 
operation/services. In addition, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Status of 
Mission Agreement (SOMA), MOU and LOA also act as guiding rules for 
peacekeeping operations. The relationship between the UN and the TCC are legal. 
The contract binds them to one another, but does not place one under managerial 
control. Irrespective of the country, the terms and condition of the contract ensures 
equal treatment. 
Generally, the contract for peacekeeping operation is drafted between the 
TCC’s permanent mission in the UN (on behalf of the respective government) and 
the UNDPKO. The contract management process is similar to the contract 
management process accepted by the contract management body of knowledge. 
However, it is also a little different from the commercial contract management 
process, which requires special care. For example, in case of a contract between the 
US Federal Government and a company, the US Government can be thought of as 
an agent for the American people who acts only through the powers given to it by 
the people of the United States; the circumstance is similar in the UN process: the 
UNDPKO acts as an agent for the UN for signing contracts with respective TCCs 
(the permanent missions acts as agents). The powers given to the UNDPKO are set 
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the respective country’s permanent missions are set forth in their constitution, 
legislations and regulations. Though the contribution of troops is voluntary, the TCC 
has no authority to deviate from the agreement with which they have agreed to 
comply. As with any other regulation, the SOP of Military Division, COE Manual, UN 
Procurement Manual, UN Laws have been promulgated through the legal regulatory 
process. These manuals, SOPs, and guidelines are considered to have the force 
and effect of law; thus, neither the receiver nor the provider of troops/services have 
authority on their own to deviate from these regulations.  
F. DRY/WET LEASE DECISION-MAKING 
In the process of planning, it is necessary to determine what types of troops/ 
equipment/service(s) to acquire and when. The first management problem for the 
UN is to decide which country and what services to contract and whether the TCC 
would have a dry or wet lease agreement. The dry lease means the TCC will 
contribute only troops; the equipment will be provided by the UN through a separate 
organization or country under a separate contract. The wet lease means the TCC 
will have all its essential equipment owned, operated and maintained by contingent 
during the complete duration of the mission. This dry-lease or wet-lease decision 
requires consideration of many factors, some of which are strategically important. 
The decision to dry lease creates a force deployment that needs to be implemented 
in cooperation with another country or with the UN itself.  Generally, the UN Security 
Council prefers peacekeeping missions with wet lease. There is another process 
called Bi-lateral Agreement, in which a country offers troops but the equipment is 
provided by another UN member State. In this case, the TCC is reimbursed for its 
troop deployment, and the country providing equipment is reimbursed for equipment. 
However, the UN does not generally follow this system (Aircraft Management and 
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G. CONTENTS OF A STANDARD MOU AND LOA 
Though there is no uniform format in a typical MOU, the contents are as 
follows (UN, 2006, January 11, p. 148): 
1. The signatories 
2. Articles stating various terms and conditions, regulations and their 
explanations. 
3. Annexes explaining the following items: 
a. Annex ‘A’—Personnel  
i. Requirement 
ii. Reimbursement 
iii. General condition 
b. Annex ‘B’—Major equipment provided by the TCC 
i. Requirement and reimbursement rate 
ii. General condition 
iii. Verification and control procedure 
iv. Transportation 
v. Mission usage factor 
vi. Loss or damage 
vii. Loss or damage in transit 
viii. Special case equipment 
ix. Liability for damage to major equipment 
c. Annex ‘C’—Self-sustainment provided by the TCC 
i. Requirement and reimbursement rate 
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iii. Verification and control procedure 
iv. Transportation 
v. Mission-related usage factors 
vi. Loss or damage 
d. Annex ‘D’—Performance standard for major equipment 
e. Annex ‘E’—Performance standard for self-sustainment 
f. Definitions 
g. Guidelines for troop contributors 
A typical LOA has similar contents; however, it is very concise. It pertains to 
the lease of special equipment/weapon systems only, and it is more technical in 
nature. The signatories are the same. The articles and Annexes are similar to that of 
a MOU.  
H. PREDICTING THE SIZE OF UN PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS 
The character and the size of UN peacekeeping operations have changed 
dramatically over the past fifty years. What began as an experiment in 1948 in 
sending a small number of unarmed observers to supervise a truce in the Middle 
East has blossomed into multitask operations that include a wide variety of civilian 
and military personnel working on election supervision, humanitarian assistance, 
and State-building (to name but a few functions). One apparent trend is the dramatic 
increase in the size of peacekeeping operations. During the Cold War, the average 
operation numbered only a few thousand (and many were considerably fewer); yet, 
some of the more recent operations have been substantially larger: the UN operation 
in Cambodia included almost 30,000 personnel, and the NATO-sponsored mission 
in Bosnia has approximately 60,000 troops associated with it. In the aggregate, UN 
peacekeeping personnel worldwide reached a peak of over 80,000—much greater 
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field at any one time (Green, Kahl & Diehl, 1998, Summer, p. 485). The following 
table shows the number of peacekeepers over the years (Henry L. Stimson Center, 
2007). 
Figure 3.2. UN Peacekeeping Personnel 1948 – 2006 
The size of the contingent and type of equipment that a peacekeeping force 
requires to support a peacekeeping operation depends on several factors. These 
include the (Global Security.org, 2007): 
a. Specific type of peacekeeping operation,  
b. Support responsibilities outlined in the terms of reference , 
c. Size of the force being supported,  
d. Duration of the operation (or rotation within an operation),  
e. Environmental considerations, such as the degree of urbanization or 
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f. Degree to which the belligerents are maintaining peace,  
g. Existing facilities and services, and  
h. Availability of contracted engineering support.  
The terms of references outline the specific missions of the contingent to a 
peacekeeping force. In some multinational operations, another country may be 
tasked to provide similar support to the force as a whole. In other cases, the 
deployed contingent may be tasked to provide all peacekeeping support for the 
operation. The type of support may include base development, maintenance and 
some internal engineer support to implement force-protection measures. There may 
also be combat missions that affect the whole force.  
The size of the force provided to a peacekeeping operation may range from 
several observers to a few divisions with associated arms and services reinforced 
with support assets, or to an even larger force. If the force moves into an area with 
no facilities, it would definitely require sufficient construction/engineering skills. If the 
peacekeeping force moves into existing facilities, the requirement for 
construction/engineering skills depends on who will maintain the facilities.  
How the belligerents comply with peacekeeping force deployment affects the 
need for force structure. A relatively benign environment requires minimal combat 
support. This is the case with the Multinational Force and Observers in almost all UN 
deployments, where each ground troop division is supported by reinforced squads 
during its rotation. In more threatening environments (where all disputing parties are 
not complying with a cease-fire, for example), the need for combat support skills 
increases. In some cases, one or more belligerents may continue to conduct mining 
operations, for example, in contested areas or along peacekeeping force-patrol 
routes. They may place booby traps as defensive measures or to harass opponents 
or peacekeepers. The belligerents may conduct openly aggressive activities such as 
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standard combat operations, possibly under fire. Due to the high-risk and high-stress 
nature of these operations, the number of combat forces should be increased.  
I. APPLYING CONTRACT PRINCIPLES 
Although contracting principles in the UN are different from generally 
accepted contracting principles identified by the contract management body of 
knowledge, basic principles like formation, offer, acceptance, consideration, 
competent parties and legality of purpose are more or less common. Many principles 
can be taken for granted; for instance, in the case of the contract management in the 
UN, it is assumed that the TCCs also operate following the same principles. 
J. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
1. Generally Accepted Contract Management Process as Identified by the 
Contract Management Body of Knowledge 
Acquisition planning is considered procurement planning in the contract 
management body of knowledge. Market-based societies developed the concept of 
a contract in response to critical problems like uncertainty and risk of delivery time 
and performance of services. Contracts act as management tools to mitigate 
uncertainty and risk (Garrett, 2003, p. 18). The use of such documented 
relationships enables buyers and sellers to enforce their agreement through the 
power of government, thereby reducing the risk associated with commercial 
transactions of goods and services. The contracting concepts of large contracts are 
quite complex; such intricate contracts can be considered projects. In managing 
contracts as projects, it is essential to breakdown the contract management process 
into smaller steps that can be handled easily. The contract management process 
has three common phases—comprised of six major steps for buyer and six major 
activities for seller. The following figure gives a bird’s eye view of the generally 
accepted contract management process as identified by the contract management 
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Phase 1: Pre-Award 
         
Buyer  1. Procurement Planning 
 2. Solicitation 
Planning 
 3. Solicitation 
   Make/buy Decision    
Seller  1. Pre-sale Activities 
 2. Bid/no-bid 
Decision Making 
 3. Bid or Proposal 
Preparation 
                                      Bid Decision 
Phase 2: Award   Phase 3: Post Award 
           
Buyer  4. Source Selection 
 5.Contract 
Administration  
6. Contract Closeout/ 
Termination 





 5. Contract 
Administration 
 6. Contract Closeout/ 
Termination 
              
Table 3.1. Contract Management Process (Garrett, 2003) 
2. Contract Management Process Planning of the UNDPKO (as Receiver) 
The UN contract management process for acquiring peacekeeping operation 
is termed as “Force Generation Process.”  Force generation is the process in which 
military forces and equipment are acquired from the TCCs to meet the requirements 
of the Concept of Operations (CONOPs). The force generation team (FGT) 
manages the force generation, rotation of troops’ contingent/sustenance and 
repatriation process of both formed units and individuals deployed as part of the 
military component of UN missions or peacekeeping operations and is the focal point 
of contact for TCCs. The force generation process consists of the following (SOP, 
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a. Developing the Concept of Operations   
b. Approaching Member States, Potential TCCs  
c. Assessment visits  
d. Selection of TCCs  
e. Joint Reconnaissance Visits  
f. MOU Negotiations and Signings  
g. Pre-deployment Visits  
h. Deployment 
i. Rotation/Repatriation 
3. Contract Management Process Structure in the UNDPKO (as Receiver) 
Typical UN peacekeeping contracts are very complex and, as such, are 
managed as projects. These peacekeeping contracts are goal-oriented, involve 
coordinated undertaking of related activities, are finite in duration and unique—each 
different from the other (FGS Official, 2007, February 7). Similar to the contract 
management process accepted by the contract management body of knowledge, the 
contract management process for acquiring UN peacekeeping operations/services 
without specialized equipment/weapon systems has three phases: pre-award, award 
and post-award (Garrett, 2003, p. 20; FGS Official, 2007, February 6). 
4. Pre-award Phase 
The Pre-award phase has four major activities. 
a. Acquisition Planning 
The acquisition planning process identifies which types of 
services/performances are required to perform peacekeeping operations in a 
particular place or situation. This process involves determining whether to make wet 
or dry lease, how to lease, what to lease, how much to lease (force structure), and 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 36- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
the statement of work, force description, availability of force, contract-type selection 
and associated risks. The planning is done by a team of experts consisting of 
military planners, financial personnel, logistics experts, etc. of the UNDPKO. 
Basically, military planners are active-duty military professionals deputed to the 
UNDPKO from its member States for a certain duration.  
b. Solicitation Planning 
The process of preparing the documents to support solicitation is termed 
solicitation planning. This process involves documenting program requirements and 
identifying potential sources. In this phase, the UN: 
a. Determines its requirement or deliverables, 
b. Identifies potential TCCs, 
c. Analyzes the sources of uncertainty and the risk that the UN will face, 
d. Develops terms and conditions of the contract, 
e. Chooses the method of source selection and proposal evaluation, 
negotiation and contract formation, and 
f. Arranges for effective administration of the contract. 
c. Market Research 
Market research is a process to collect, organize, maintain, analyze and 
present data for the purpose of maximizing the capabilities, technology and 
competitive forces of the market place to meet an organization’s needs for supplies 
and services. The UNDPKO maintains a database containing the lists of member 
States with identified capabilities and past participation records. However, the UN 
encourages the inclusion of new TCCs in every mission—subject to willingness, 
commitment, performance verification and evaluation (FGS Official, 2007, February 
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d. Solicitation 
In the process of obtaining information (bids and proposals) from prospective 
TCCs for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services, the UNDPKO asked all 
potential TCCs to identify their willingness, proposals for contribution of suitable 
troops and their equipment (SOP, 2005, June, p. 22). The UN also negotiates with 
its member TCC for reimbursement and possible deployment with or without 
equipment at a prescribed time. However, the COE manual provides standard rates 
of reimbursement and a reimbursement guideline.  
5. Award Phase 
Based on solicitations, the UN evaluates all bids from different TCCs for 
possible TCC selection. The consent from the host country, political consideration, 
and stakeholders’ interest plays a major role in determining the TCC selection (FGS 
Official, 2007, February 6). The award phase consists of two steps, namely source 
selection and contract negotiation and formation.  
a. Source Selection 
Source selection may be as simple as determining the lowest bidder, which 
may involve weeks or even months of proposal analysis, inspection and testing. The 
selection may be done by one person or a group of professionals. The UN source-
selection process is different than that followed in the commercial sector. Since 
reimbursement is based upon a fixed rate contained in the COE manual, cost does 
not play any major role in source selection. The UN follows a best-value approach 
for selecting troops’ contingents with COE only. Additionally, the UN considers the 
following factors during source selection (UN, 2001, September, p. 7; MPS Official, 
2007, February 7): 
a. Political acceptability, 
b. Threat scenario, 
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d. Willingness of host country, warring factions, the UN and potential TCC 
and donors, 
e. Acceptance of the UNDPKO Concept of Operations and Rules of 
Engagement, 
f. Military readiness and capability to undertake military operations,  
g. Self-sustainment capability,  
h. Cost, 
i.  Command and control, 
j. Geographic representation, 
k Compatibility of equipment system with UN-operated equipment, and 
l. Past performance. 
When a number of TCCs are willing to provide similar units with similar 
military readiness and capabilities, they are placed on a “short list” for further 
evaluation via an assessment visit. Such visits are usually attended by 
representatives of the FGS, Office of Mission Support (OMS), Logistic Support 
Division (LSD) and FMS (Financial Management Service) and may include a 
representative from the mission (if already established).  Detailed briefings are 
usually conducted to ensure the CONOPS is clearly understood and that the COE 
and self-sustainment requirements and procedures are adhered to. The FGS takes 
the lead in these visits and will issue a detailed “After Inspection Report” that will 
summarize the TCC’s level of readiness and will recommend which TCC should be 
selected to deploy to the Mission.  It should also evaluate the readiness of the TCC 
to deploy and highlight the shortfalls to be overcome before any agreement to 
deploy can be reached (SOP, 2005, June, p. 11). To select a TCC for specialized 
equipment/weapon system like aircraft, helicopters, ships, specialized vehicles, etc., 
all factors mentioned for source selection of a TCC are followed. However, here cost 
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b. Contract Negotiation and Formation 
After the TCC is selected, the FGS and TCC must reach a certain 
understanding of the nature of their undertaking and negotiate the terms and 
conditions of the MOU/LOA. After the reconnaissance visit, Member States 
negotiate with the UNDPKO for the MOU/LOA for the agreed-upon unit. The FGS 
(which will take the lead), discusses and agrees upon the terms and conditions for 
the number of personnel, major equipment and self-sustainment categories that the 
UN will reimburse for the TCC’s contribution to a UN Peacekeeping Mission. The 
result of these negotiations will be an agreed-upon MOU/LOA, which will be formally 
signed by the Permanent Representative of the Country to the UN and USG, 
UNDPKO (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, 2003, December, p. 65). The process 
of signing both the MOU and LOA are almost the same. The detailed process of 
signing the MOU is given in Figure 3-1. 
6. Post-award Phase 
The final phase in the contract management process is the post-award phase, 
which consists of Pre-deployment Inspection, Deployment, Contract Administration 
and Contract Close-out and Termination. In UN peacekeeping operations, the post-
award phase of contract management is very challenging, since various contingents 
from different parts of the world are deployed in the same geographical mission 
areas having various terms and conditions of employment, diverse operating 
procedures, diverse training, diverse equipment systems, command and control 
structures, languages and communication difficulties. The SRSG, a high-ranking UN 
civilian staff, is in charge of a peacekeeping mission. The military aspects are dealt 
with by the Force Commander, or FC. All military components of the peacekeeping 
operations are directly under the FC (Voetmann, 1997, April, p. 2). All UN 
peacekeeping missions are managed as projects. In the DPKO, existing missions 
are overseen by Current Military Operations Services (CMOS), a unit of MILAD. 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 40- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
civilian staffs manage the political, administrative, communication, logistic and 
financial functions. The post-award phase consists of the following activities: 
a. Pre-deployment Inspection or Assessment Visits 
One or two weeks prior to movement of vehicles, major equipment and self-
sustainment stores to the mission area, a UNDPKO Team consisting of 
representatives from the FGS, LSD, FMS and, if required, a representative from the 
Mission, will move to the TCC in order to assist in any outstanding issue prior to their 
departure and to assess any shortfall in their level of readiness and recommend 
solutions prior to the deployment to the Mission area (SOP, 2005, June, p. 11). 
b. Deployment 
Once the pre-deployment visit is completed, Movement Control (MOVCON) of 
the UN makes all arrangements for shipping cargo to the mission area. Generally, all 
heavy loads are transported by ship. Troops, along with their integral light 
equipment/weapon system/cargo, are transported by chartered aircraft or 
commercial cargo aircraft. The UN may also request the TCC to provide airlift 
support for deployment if need be. In such cases, the TCC is reimbursed for air 
transport.  
Generally, a deployment is either one year or six months (depending on the 
agreement between the UNDPKO and the TCC). When the mandate of a mission is 
extended, the UN may request the same TCC to continue to provide the same 
services (which is generally done and obviously understandable). If the TCC agrees, 
then the UN arranges rotation with the help of MOVCON unit. If the TCC is unwilling 
to continue, then the UN may go for another contract with another TCC. UN incurs 
all expenditure for rotation of troops at intervals not less than six months and usually 
not more than twelve months (p. 13). 
c. Contract Administration 
The contract administration is the process of ensuring that each party’s 
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peacekeeping missions are conducted by contingents from multiple TCCs, and 
communications and logistics supports are provided by different providers. Hence, a 
key aspect of contract administration is managing the interfaces among various 
providers. Together, all contingents function as a bigger organization, integrating the 
efforts of many contingents and organizations under a clear command and control 
structure. Since peace depends on the collective functions of all elements of the 
deployed contingents in the mission areas, the consequence of failure to do effective 
contract administration could be very significant.  
(1) Post-deployment Inspection.  Once the military contingent arrives in 
the Mission area, within the first 30 days after arrival, the Missions 
COE Unit will conduct an “Arrival Inspection” to verify that the units 
have met the operational requirements. The Mission COE Unit follow-
ups with any shortfall in coordination with the FMS, LSD and FGS. The 
FGS, in turn, follows up with the respective Permanent Mission of the 
TCC in order to resolve the issue.  
(2) Contract Guide.  For all issues, the MOU and LOA act as the primary 
document for administering the contract.  
(3) Change.  If there is any change in Concept of Operation, the FGS has 
an effective process for managing change. The changes are called 
amendments. The changes are implemented upon agreement from 
both the TCC and host country.  
(4) Payment.  The UN has an established procedure for payment, which is 
different from the procedure followed in commercial acquisition. The 
payment from the service is called reimbursement, which is at a fixed 
price stipulated in the COE Manual.  
(5) Dispute Resolution.  The UN has an established mechanism to discuss 
and resolve any dispute arising from the application of the MOU/LOA 
amicably by negotiation. This mechanism is comprised of two levels of 
dispute resolution. The first level is in the mission area, where the 
Chief Administrative Officer and the contingent Commander attempt to 
reach a negotiated settlement of the dispute. If the dispute is not 
resolved in the first level, it is resolved in the second level between the 
representative of the Permanent Mission of the TCC and the Under-
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d. Contract Close-out and Termination 
A peacekeeping operation is closed down as a result of a Security Council 
resolution. A peacekeeping operation is considered completed when all troops and 
associated personnel are withdrawn, all administrative actions have been 
completed, all disputes settled, and final payment has been made to all TCCs, 
contractors and associated agencies. The Military Planning Division is the lead 
agent in the planning for the closure of a mission, in co-ordination with the mission in 
the field. The planning document for closeout is called the Liquidation Plan. In 
concert with the Field Administration and Logistics Division and its liquidation team, 
the Planning Division develops the time-frames and coordinates with other units 
outside the DPKO which are affected by the mission closure (Voetmann, 1997, April, 
p. 11). Prior to the acceptance of the plan, outside agencies, such as Non-
Governmental Organizations, are informed of the projected withdrawal of security 
forces. A typical liquidation plan includes following elements: 
1. Financial Statement, 
2. Mission Performance Report, 
3. Disposition and accountability of resources/material, 
4. Disposal of materiel—including redeployment to other mission areas 
and sale of excess articles, 
5. Payment, 
6. Claims and Disputes, 
7. Donation to the host country (has to be approved by General 
Assembly), 
8. Closure of Audit, and 
9. Archiving of all records. (UNDPKO, 2006, July 11) 
Though there is an established procedure for reimbursement against an 
MOU/LOA to any TCC, the payment by the UNDPKO often gets delayed. The UN 
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Unfortunately, there is a significant shortage of funds for peacekeeping operations, 
since a good number of member States do not pay their contributions regularly. The 
following table highlights the contributions due to UN by various Member States 
(Global Security.org, 2007).  
 
Figure 3.3. Contribution Due to UN by Member States 
7. Contract Management Process in the TCC (as Provider) 
Similar to the UNDPKO, the contract management process followed by a 
TCC has three phases: pre-award, award and post-award (Garrett, 2003, p. 20; 
Officials of Permanent Missions of Bangladesh and Pakistan to UN, 2007, February 
8). 
8. Pre-award Phase 
The Pre-award phase has four major activities: 
a. Troops’ Contribution Planning 
The troops’ contribution planning process identifies which types of 
contingents/services the UNDPKO may require to perform peacekeeping operations 
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for a wet or dry lease. The TCCs regularly prepare their units, giving them formal 
training on UN peacekeeping operations (2007, February 8).  
b. Bid/No-bid Decision 
Upon receiving initial solicitation through their permanent mission to the UN, 
the TCCs decide whether they would like to participate in the contribution process or 
not.  
c. Proposal Preparation 
Subject to their own government’s decision, the TCCs’ Ministry of Defense, 
with the help of their respective service headquarters, prepare and send proposals 
to the UNDPKO. Though initial information on a prospective troops’ contribution to 
TCC is given via respective permanent missions, all subsequent communications 
are done directly between the FGS and the TCC. 
9. Award Phase 
a. Contract Negotiation and Formation 
During the award-phase, the contract is negotiated and signed. The time 
required depends on the size of the contingent and complexity of the mission. The 
TCC’s permanent mission military advisor conducts the negotiations on its behalf.   
10. Post-award Phase 
The final phase in the contract management process is the post-award phase, 
which consists of Contract Administration and Contract Close-out and Termination. 
The post-award phase has the following activities: 
a. Contract Administration 
The contract administration process includes Pre- and Post-deployment 
Inspection, deployment and mission execution.  
1. Pre-deployment Inspection by FGS.  One or two weeks prior to 
deployment, a DPKO Team (consisting of representatives from the 
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whether the TCC is providing all equipment agreed upon in the 
contract (SOP, 2005, June, p. 11).. 
2. Deployment. Once the pre-deployment visit is completed, MOVCON of 
the UN makes all arrangements for shipping cargo/load to the mission 
area. As stated previously, the UN may also request the TCC to 
provide airlift support for deployment if need be. In such a case, the 
TCC is reimbursed for such air transport.  
3. Mission Execution.  In this step, the deployed contingents carry out the 
mission as specified in the terms and agreement of the contract. The 
UN provides reimbursement to the TCC. Any dispute during the 
mission execution is settled via Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).   
b. Contract Close-out and Termination 
A peacekeeping operation is closed down as a result of a Security Council 
resolution. A peacekeeping operation is considered completed when all troops and 
associated equipment are withdrawn, all administrative actions have been 
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Table 3.2. Contract Management Process in Peacekeeping Perspective 
(Adapted from Garrett, 2003) 
The governments of TCCs play a significant role in the continuation of 
peacekeeping operations. Any time the UN delays payment/reimbursement to a 
TCC, the respective government of that TCC generally pays the troops and 
contingents from their own resources. After it receives reimbursement from the UN, 
it adjusts its fund (Officials of Permanent Missions of Bangladesh and Pakistan to 
UN, 2007, February 8). Thus, operations continue unhindered. However, during the 
research it was observed that most of the peacekeeping missions have become 
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maintains a presence for monitoring certain functions. A successful closeout may not 
be the indication of a successful mission, but it gives an indication of the post-
peacekeeping healing process.  
K. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided a literature review on contract management processes 
followed by the UN. It identified and discussed the following UN contract 
management process: contract planning, contract elements, contract types, legal 
framework, contents of standard MOU and LOA and application of contract 
principles. In the following chapter, the evaluation of the UN contract management 
process for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services will be discussed. The 
chapter will first introduce the concept of contract management maturity and discuss 
the selection of the Contract Management Maturity Model developed by Dr. Rene 
Rendon and published in Contract Management Organizational Assessment Tools 
by Garrett and Rendon. Thereafter, the chapter will analyze the organizational 
assessment of study participants and use the Contract Management Maturity Model 
to assess the UNDPKO (FGS) and the TCC in terms of acquiring peacekeeping 
operations/services. Lastly, the chapter will discuss how the assessment results can 
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IV.THE EVALUATION OF CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 
PROCESS THROUGH THE CMMM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided a literature review of the UN’s contract 
management process for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services. In this 
chapter, the evaluation of the contract management process in the UN for acquiring 
peacekeeping operations/services will be discussed. The chapter will provide a 
description of the Contract Management Maturity Model developed by Dr. Rendon 
(2003). Thereafter, the chapter will carry out the organizational assessment of study 
participants, apply the Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM) to FGS and 
TCC and analyze the assessment results. Lastly, the chapter will discuss how the 
CMMM results can be used to improve the FGS’s contract management process 
maturity. 
B. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT MATURITY 
Contract management maturity is the organizational contract management 
capability that can consistently produce successful business results for buyers and 
sellers of products, services, and integrated solutions. The maturity level of an 
organization’s contract management process can be assessed to determine the 
overall organizational contract management performance. To conduct this 
assessment, the evaluator needs to (Garrett & Rendon, 2005, p. 47): 
a. Develop or select an organizational contract management capability 
maturity model for both the buyer and seller, 
b. Develop or select an appropriate assessment tool for the buyer and 
seller for measuring organizational contract management maturity, and  
c. Apply the maturity model and assessment tool to an organization and 
use the assessment results as a guide for improving the organization’s 
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C. SELECTION OF A BASIC MATURITY MODEL 
Because of obvious reasons, this study is based on available research tools. 
Within the fields of management, a handful of organizational assessment tools are 
available to evaluate the management process so as to improve the management 
performance. There is only one CMMM available, developed by Rendon, to analyze 
contract management maturity level. Considering the CMMM’s versatility, the Model 
was selected to evaluate the UN’s contract management process for acquiring 
peacekeeping operation/services. The CMMM utilized by this study uses a 
systematic approach for assessing the maturity level of any organization’s contract 
management process. This research-based systematic assessment tool was 
selected to evaluate overall contract management process capability of both a 
receiver and a provider. The Contract Management Maturity Assessment Tool 
(CMMAT) was tailored to evaluate FGS’s contract management process maturity. It 
is comprised of sets of survey questions developed for FGS as receiver. Similarly, 
the CMMAT was tailored to evaluate a TCC’s contract management process 
maturity. It is comprised of sets of survey questions developed for a TCC as a 
provider of services.  It also intended to help benchmark a country’s contract 
management strength and assess areas for improvement. The CMMM adapted for 
this study consists of five-levels of maturity, with each level building upon the 
previous maturity level. These five levels are “ad-hoc,” “basic,” “structured,” 
“integrated” and “optimized” (Garrett & Rendon, 2005, p. 53). The following describe 
the five contract management process maturity levels considered in CMMM: 
1. Ad-hoc.  Ad-hoc is the lowest level in the CMMM, which is determined 
by the following characteristics: 
a. The FGS acknowledges that contract management processes 
exist, that these processes are accepted and practiced for all 
UN peacekeeping missions, and the FGS/TCC understands the 
benefit and value of using contract management processes. 
b. Although there are no established basic contract management 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 51- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
exist and are used within the FGS/TCC, but applied only on an 
ad-hoc and sporadic basis to various contracts. 
c. Informal documentation of contract management processes 
may exist within the FGS/TCC, but are used only on an ad-hoc 
and sporadic basis on various contracts. 
d. Organizational managers and contract management personnel 
are not held accountable for adhering to, or complying with, any 
contract management processes or standards. 
2. Basic.  Basic is the second level of CMMM and has the following 
characteristics: 
a. Some basic contract management processes and standards 
have been established within the FGS/TCC, but are required 
only on selected, complex or critical, missions.  
b. Some formal documentation has been developed for these 
established contract management processes and standards. 
c. The FGS/TCC does not consider these contract management 
processes or standards established or institutionalized 
throughout the FGS/TCC. 
d. There is no organizational policy requiring the consistent use of 
these contract management processes and standards other 
than on the required contracts. 
3. Structured.  This is the third level of CMMM and consists of the 
following: 
a. Contract management processes and standards are fully 
established, institutionalized, and mandated throughout the 
FGS/TCC. 
b. Formal documentation has been developed for these contract 
management processes and standards, and some processes 
may even be automated. 
c. Since these contract management processes are mandated, the 
FGS/TCC allows the tailoring of processes and documents, 
allowing consideration for the unique aspects of each contract—
such as contracting strategy, contract type, terms and 
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d. Senior management is involved in providing guidance, direction, 
and even approval of key contracting strategy, decisions, 
related contract terms and conditions, and contract 
management documents. 
4. Integrated.  This is the fourth level of CMMM, which has the following 
characteristics: 
a. The peacekeeping mission HQ in the field is an integral member 
of the acquisition team. 
b. Basic contract management processes are integrated with other 
organizational core processes—such as adhering to mandate, 
cost control, schedule management and performance 
management. 
c. Management uses efficiency and effectiveness metrics to make 
acquisition-related decisions. 
d. Management understands its role in the acquisition/contract 
management process and executes the process well. 
5. Optimized. The highest level of the CMMM is Optimized, which 
consists of the following characteristics: 
a. Contract management processes are evaluated periodically 
using efficiency and effectiveness metrics. 
b. Continuous process improvement efforts are implemented to 
improve the contract management process. 
c. Lessons learned and best-practice programs are implemented 
to improve the contract management processes, standards, and 
documentation. 
d. Acquisition process streamlining initiatives are implemented as 
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D. ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STUDY PARTNERS 
1. The FGS 
To conduct a peacekeeping operation, the Military Division of the UNDPKO 
must coordinate actions with other branches of the Secretariat. This research 
concentrates on the military aspects of peacekeeping operation. Other related 
functions are assumed to have been completed as planned or to be completed as 
expected. The UNDPKO is a large organization that is responsible for the 
negotiation and signing of the MOU/LOA for acquisition of peacekeeping 
operations/services. The FGS receives its mandate and approval from the Security 
Council and Secretary General respectively and then plans and executes the 
contract management maturity process. The Under Secretary General (USG), DPKO 
is authorized and responsible for signing the contract (MOU/LOA) on behalf of the 
UNDPKO. The USG is appointed by the Secretary General.  
2. TCCs 
On the other hand, TCCs were taken as respondents for the assessment as 
provider, since they provide required forces and associated weapon and equipment 
systems. For the CMMM assessment, seven TCCs were selected based on troops’ 
contribution, history of peacekeeping and geographical area. Three leading TCCs 
are Pakistan, Bangladesh and India; four highly reputed traditional peacekeepers 
come from Europe (Sweden), South America (Uruguay), Africa (Ghana) and the 
Middle East (Jordan) (UN, 2007b)1. All Military Advisors of the Permanent Missions 
in the UN for their respective countries were contacted and surveyed. Despite 
repeated effort, no response was received from the Permanent Mission of India to 
the UN and the Permanent Mission of Ghana to the UN. Military Advisers of 
Pakistan and Bangladesh’s Permanent Mission in the UN participated in the study—
granting interviews and survey responses. Because of time constraints, the other 
                                            
1 Presently three leading troops’ contributors in UN for peacekeeping operations are Pakistan, India 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 54- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
three TCC Military Advisors could not be scheduled for interview. However, they 
agreed to respond to questions if sent electronically. Accordingly, all were sent 
survey questions. In addition to the responses from the Permanent Mission of 
Pakistan and Bangladesh to the UN, the answers to the survey questions from the 
Permanent Mission of Sweden and Jordan in the UN were received and analyzed for 
the research. Despite giving reminders, no response was received from the 
Permanent Missions of Uruguay and Ghana.  
E. APPLICATION OF CMMM 
The contract management process for acquiring peacekeeping 
operations/services is a core management process. A self-administered CMMM 
survey was found to be an excellent assessment tool for obtaining information on 
any organization’s management process. Hence, the CMMM self-administered 
survey was adopted and used as the assessment method for evaluating the contract 
management process for acquiring UN peacekeeping operations/services. The 
survey responses, in turn, were used to assess the maturity level of contract 
management key process areas and key practice activities of the FGS. The following 
contains CMMAT, which consists of the survey statement and the survey response 
options.  
1. Survey Statement 
The adopted CMMM uses two self-administered surveys, one for the FGS 
and one for the TCCs. The surveys contain statements related to key process areas 
of the FGS as a receiver of services and key process areas of each TCC as a 
provider of services. The contract management key process areas for the FGS are 
acquisition planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract 
administration and contract close-out. The key process areas for TCC are troops’ 
contribution planning, bid/no-bid decision-making, proposal preparation, contract 
negotiation and formation, contract administration and contract close-out. And all 
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assessment. A separate set of survey statements was used for each area. The aim 
of the survey statements was to obtain information on the extent that the FGS and 
TCCs implemented various key practice activities. It also indicated the maturity level 
of the specific contract management key process area addressed. Thus, the totality 
of the respondent’s answers to specific survey statements determined whether the 
FGS and the TCCs were at the “ad-hoc,” “basic,” “structured,” “integrated” or 
“optimized” level of maturity for their key specific process areas (Garrett & Rendon, 
2005, p. 52). 
2. Survey Response Options 
The CMMAT uses a Likert scale response protocol (p. 52). With this type of 
response structure, the respondent is asked to agree or disagree with each 
statement. The respondent has six responses to choose from, ranging from “never” 
to “always” or “don’t know” for each statement. Each response is given a numerical 
score to reflect its degree of attitude favorableness; for example, a response of 
“always” equals to a score of five. The response of “don’t know” equals 0. The 
rational for assigning a value of 0 to the “don’t know” was that for an organizational 
process to be capable and effective, it must be well known, understood and 
accepted throughout the FGS/TCC. A “don’t know” response indicates that the 
specific key process area or key practice activity is not well established or 
understood throughout the FGS/TCC. The Likert scale allows the optional responses 
to be correlated with different levels of the maturity model for that specific contract 
management process area. Thus, the response option chosen for each survey item 
was used to determine the level of process capability maturity for that specific aspect 
of the contract management process. The scores for all of the survey statements for 
that key process area were then totaled, and the total score was converted to the 
maturity level of that specific contract management process area. A conversion table 
within the CMMM was used to convert the total scores for each contract 
management process area to a specific maturity level. Once the surveys for each of 
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management maturity assessments of both the FGS and TCCs were completed for 
their respective key process areas. All possible caution was taken to ensure 
understanding, clarity, relevance and effectiveness of the survey statements, 
optional responses, and overall mechanics of the assessment tool.  
3. Application of CMMM 
a. Application to FGS 
The FGS deals with both contingents (troops and contingent-owned 
equipment) and specialized equipment. Contingents deployed with integral 
equipment/weapons systems will use a MOU contract format. When a contingent 
deploys with special equipment/weapons systems, a LOA contract format will be 
used along with the MOU (FGS Officials, 2007, February 8). To understand the 
contract management maturity of the FGS, the CMMM was applied to FGS MOUs 
and LOAs pertaining to surveyed TCCs.  
b. Application to TCC 
To understand the contract management maturity of the TCCs, the CMMM 
was applied to two leading troops’ contributors and two reputable traditional TCCs. 
Presently, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Jordan each has 5 contingents deployed 
at various mission areas—having a number of MOUs for contingents and LOAs for 
specialized equipment contingents. Ghana, Uruguay and Sweden have 4, 3 and 1 
contingents respectively, having corresponding numbers of MOUs (UN, 2007b)2. 
Since survey responses received from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan and Sweden 
focused primarily on the MOUs and LOAs mentioned above, the response analysis 
was also based on those same replies. This application of CMMM on FGS and TCC 
highlighted their contract management process maturity. 
                                            
2 A contingent may be formed by a company, battalion, brigade or even a division. A specialized 
contingent may be formed depending on type and number of equipment and its supporting personnel. 
Only the major contingent deployment with COE were considered, not troops’ deployment without 
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F. EVALUATION OF ASSESSMENT RESULT 
1. Evaluation of Assessment on the FGS 
This phase focuses on the evaluation of the assessment results to determine 
the maturity level of the FGS’s contract management process capability. Since all 
branches work together to complete the contract management process, branches 
were not isolated individually; instead, the CMMAT was applied to the FGS’s overall 
response to the survey. Table 4.1 provides a listing of the survey score for each 
contract management key process area of the FGS, and Table 4.2 provides an 
overall listing of maturity level for each contract management process area. This 
assessment indicates that the FGS contract management process is documented 
and institutionalized. Because of the UNDPKO’s unique operating procedure, FGS 
allows tailoring of this contract management process subject to changed mission 
scenarios. Also, all concerned personnel within the FGS hierarchy provide guidance, 
approval and even key contract management strategy within the contract 
management process. Based on survey responses, only “Source Selection” was 
assessed at a “Basic” level of maturity. Solicitation, contract administration and 
contract closeout were found to be “Integrated,” and solicitation planning was found 
to be at the “Structured” level. Acquisition planning was found to be at an 
“Optimized” level of maturity. The area-wise analysis on FGS will be discussed in the 
next phase. The tables below show the survey scores and contract management 









do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 58- 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
FGS Scores against Activities 
Acquisition Planning Scores Source Selection Scores 
0-20 Ad-hoc   0-20 Ad-hoc   
21-30 Basic   21-30 Basic 30 
31-40 Structured   31-40 Structured   
41-45 Integrated   41-45 Integrated   
46-50 Optimized 48 46-50 Optimized   
Solicitation Planning   Contract Administration   
0-20 Ad-hoc   0-20 Ad-hoc   
21-30 Basic   21-30 Basic   
31-40 Structured 39 31-40 Structured   
41-45 Integrated   41-45 Integrated 45 
46-50 Optimized   46-50 Optimized   
Solicitation   Contract Close-out   
0-20 Ad-hoc   0-20 Ad-hoc   
21-30 Basic   21-30 Basic   
31-40 Structured   31-40 Structured   
41-45 Integrated 41 41-45 Integrated 44 
46-50 Optimized   46-50 Optimized   
 
Table 4.1.Survey Score of FGS, UNDPKO  
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Table 4.2.    Contract Management Maturity Level of FGS  
(Adapted from Garrett & Rendon, 2005) 
2. Evaluation of Assessment on the TCCs 
This phase focuses on the evaluation of the assessment results to determine 
the maturity level of each TCC’s contract management process capability. The 
CMMAT was applied to survey responses from four TCCs (Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
Jordan and Sweden). Table 4.3 provides a listing of survey scores for each contract 
management key process area for each surveyed TCC. Table 4.4 provides an 
overall listing of maturity level for each contract management process area. This 
assessment indicates that the contract management process is documented and 
institutionalized. All TCCs allow tailoring of the contract management process 
subject to changed mission scenarios. Also, all concerned personnel in respective 
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process. Based on survey responses, in terms of TCC Jordan, all areas of contract, 
i.e., “troops’ contribution planning,” “bid/no-bid decision,” “proposal preparation,” 
“contract negotiation and formation,” “contract administration,” and “contract 
closeout” were found to have a “Structured” level of maturity. With respect to TCC 
Bangladesh, the contract management process areas of “troops’ contribution 
planning,” “bid/no-bid decision,” “proposal preparation” and “contract closeout” 
activities were found to have an “Integrated” level of maturity. Their “contract 
negotiation and formation” was found to be a “Structured” level, and “contract 
administration” was found to have an “Optimized” level of maturity. For TCC 
Pakistan, the contract management process areas of “bid/no-bid decision,” “proposal 
preparation” and “contract closeout” were found to have an “Optimized” level of 
maturity. The “pre- troops’ contribution planning” and “contract negotiation and 
formation” areas were found to have a “Structured” level, and “contract 
administration” was found to have an “Integrated” level of maturity. With respect to 
TCC Sweden, the contract management process areas of “contract negotiation and 
formation,” “contract administration” and “contract closeout” were assessed to have 
an “Integrated” level of maturity. The “troops’ contribution planning” and “bid/no-bid 
decision” were found to have a “Structured” level, and “proposal preparation” was 
found to have an “Optimized” level of maturity. The area-wide analysis on TCCs will 
be discussed in the next phase. The tables below show the TCCs’ survey scores 
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TCC Scores against Activities 
Activities TCC Scores Activities TCC Scores 
  BD JD PK SW   BD JD PK SW 
Troops’ Contribution Planning Contract Negotiation & Formation 
Ad-hoc         Ad-hoc         
Basic         Basic         
Structured   33 37 40 Structured 37 35 34   
Integrated 43       Integrated       41 
Optimized         Optimized         
Bid/No-bid Decision Contract Administration 
Ad-hoc         Ad-hoc         
Basic         Basic         
Structured   37   40 Structured   36     
Integrated 45       Integrated     44 43 
Optimized     50   Optimized 47       
Proposal Preparation Contract Closeout 
Ad-hoc         Ad-hoc         
Basic         Basic         
Structured   39     Structured   36     
Integrated 41       Integrated 43     41 
Optimized     49 46   Optimized     47   
Legend: BD (Bangladesh), JD (Jordan), PK (Pakistan), SW (Sweden) 
Table 4.3. Survey Score of TCC  
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Table 4.4. Contract Management Maturity Level of Four Assessed TCCs 
(Adapted from Garrett & Rendon, 2005) 
G. USE OF ASSESSMENT RESULT AS A GUIDE FOR 
IMPROVING CM PROCESS CAPABILITY 
Previously, the assessment results were analyzed to determine the FGS and 
TCC’s overall contract management process maturity levels in the key process area. 
In this section, the assessment analysis is extended to identify contract management 
process areas and practice activities that need to be developed or improved to 
increase the maturity level for a specific process or for overall contract management 
capability.  This analysis will provide a road map for the FGS and TCCs to use in 
implementing contract management process improvements. This analysis will also 
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management standards, processes, documentations, or management is lacking. The 
ultimate goal is for the FGS and TCCs to be able to use the assessment survey 
results as an implementation road map—that is, as a long-term action plan for 
improving contract management process capability.  
1. The FGS 
Based on the FGS’s survey response, the assessment results reflect the 
contract management key process areas—acquisition planning, solicitation planning, 
solicitation, and contract administration—were all assessed at the “Structured to 
Optimized” maturity level. These assessment results revealed that the FGS’s basic 
contract management processes are formal and documented. Its processes are 
standardized, institutionalized and mandated throughout the FGS for all key process 
areas. Additionally, this maturity level reflects the FGS’s flexibility in tailoring its 
contract management process in consideration of the unique aspects of each 
UNDPKO’s peacekeeping strategy and contract.  
The following sections highlight specific activities for each of these contract 
management key process areas the FGS should focus on to increase the maturity 
level of its contract management processes. 
a. Acquisition Planning 
The survey assessment results indicate the FGS’s acquisition planning key 
process area was rated at the “Optimized” level. The FGS provides specific and 
focused acquisition planning in the areas of integrating acquisition planning process 
activities with other organizational process, such as deployment, financial 
management, mission management, security management and risk management. 
Additionally, the FGS always provides specific, focused mission planning in the 
areas of producing performance-based strategic estimate, concept of operation, 
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Since “Optimized” is the highest level of contract management maturity, and 
FGS is already in this level, FGS should endeavor to continue to remain in the same 
level. 
b. Solicitation Planning 
The survey assessment results indicate the FGS’s solicitation planning key 
process area was rated at the “Structured” level. The FGS provides specific, focused 
solicitation planning in the areas of integrating acquisition planning process activities 
with other organizational processes, such as timely deployment, mission 
management, financial management, security management and risk management. 
Additionally, the FGS generally provides specific and focused solicitation planning in 
the areas of producing performance-based strategic estimate, concept of operation, 
statement of work determination and logistic sustenance. Additionally, to ensure an 
effective solicitation, the FGS should continue to focus on the following areas: 
1. Prepare and maintain a qualified TCC list.  
2. Conduct market research. 
3. Advertise peacekeeping mission opportunities. 
4. Conduct pre-proposal conferences. 
Since in solicitation planning, the FGS is in “Structured” level of maturity, in 
order to move to next higher (“Integrated”) level of contract management maturity, 
the FGS needs to integrate the personnel deployed in the field in its planning 
process. The solicitation planning processes needs to be integrated with other FGS 
core processes such as timely deployment and mission management in respect of 
finance, security and risk. FGS management also needs to use efficiency and 
effectiveness metrics to make acquisition-related decisions. 
c. Solicitation 
The survey assessment results indicate the FGS’s solicitation key process 
area was rated at the “Integrated” level. The FGS’s solicitation process is specific 
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organizational processes—such as mission management, security management, 
logistics sustenance, financial management and risk management.  
Since, in solicitation, the FGS is in “Integrated” level of maturity, in order to 
move to next higher level of contract management maturity (“Optimized”), the FGS 
needs to evaluate its contract management process periodically using efficiency and 
effectiveness metrics. It also needs to ensure that continuous process improvement 
efforts and best practices and lessons learned are implemented to improve the 
contract management process.  
d. Source Selection 
Based on survey assessment results, the source-selection key process area 
was rated “Basic,” which is relatively less mature compared to other contract 
management process areas. Although the FGS’s source-selection process is 
standardized and documented, the Service does not routinely use evaluation criteria, 
evaluation standards, or weighting. Its source-selection process is highly related to 
the UN’s core principles of political neutrality, acceptance by the host country, multi-
nation participation, transparency and mandate. 
Since, in source selection, the FGS is at a “Basic” level of maturity, in order to 
move to the “Structured” level of contract management maturity, the FGS needs to 
ensure that its contract management process and standards are fully established, 
institutionalized and mandated throughout the organization. It also needs to ensure 
that formal documentation has been developed for these contract management 
processes. 
e. Contract Administration 
The survey assessment results indicate FGS’s contract administration key 
process area was rated at the “Integrated” level. This assessment revealed that 
FGS’s contract administration process is well standardized, documented and always 
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periodic performance evaluations are conducted. FGS uses alternative dispute 
resolution for resolving any issue related to contracts with TCCs.  
Since, in contract administration, FGS is in “Integrated” level of maturity, in 
order to move to next higher level of contract management maturity, the FGS needs 
to evaluate its contract management process periodically using efficiency and 
effectiveness metrics. It also needs to ensure that continuous process improvement 
efforts, best practices and lessons learned are implemented to improve contract 
management process. 
f. Contract Closeout 
The survey assessment result of the FGS’s contract management process 
capability maturity assessment indicated that the contract closeout key process area 
was rated at the “Integrated” level. Currently, forty-five of UN Peacekeeping 
Missions have been completed (InfoPlease, 2007). Though a number of those 
missions were closed-out at one stage, some of them were re-opened, and some of 
the missions have become open-ended—running for decades (2007)3. Despite the 
presence of open-ended or re-opened peacekeeping missions, FGS’s contract 
closeout process is well documented, involving checklists, templates and standard 
forms. However, none of the closeout processes are automated. Basically, the FGS 
follows standard procedures in accordance with its policy guidelines and manuals. It 
follows established processes for exercising a mutual agreement with a TCC to 
discontinue a mission completely or partially honoring contractual rights. However, 
the FGS does not always follow systematic evaluations of the contract closeout 
process. The FGS does use a lessons-learned and best-practices database to 
facilitate the planning of future missions.  
Since, in contract closeout, the FGS is in “Integrated” level of maturity, in 
order to move to the “Optimized” level of contract management maturity, the FGS 
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needs to evaluate its contract management process periodically using efficiency and 
effectiveness metrics. It also needs to ensure that continuous process-improvement 
efforts and best practices and lessons learned are implemented to improve contract 
management processes. 
As seen in this analysis, the CMMM and CMMAT provide a wealth of 
information with which to improve the FGS’s contract management process for 
acquiring peacekeeping operations/services. The assessment not only offers 
organizational insight on the level of contract management maturity of the FGS, it 
also provides the organization with an effective road map for identifying potential 
areas for process improvement. From the analysis, the weakest phase of the FGS 
contract management process was “Source Selection.” The FGS may look into the 
possible reasons and potential remedies of this weakness. Considering the 
uniqueness of the UN peacekeeping operations, the existing system works 
reasonably well for the FGS.  
2. The TCCs 
The following discussions provide only a summary-level analysis of the TCCs’ 
contract management process capability, but do not provide analyses of individual 
TCC’s contract management processes. Previously, the assessment results were 
analyzed to determine each TCC’s overall contract management process maturity 
level in the key process areas. In this section, the assessment analysis is extended 
to identify contract management key process areas and practice activities that need 
to be developed or improved to increase the maturity level for specific processes, or 
for overall contract management capability.  Since it is a summary-level analysis, it 
will not provide a road map for individual TCCs to use as improvement tools for their 
contract management process improvements.  
The assessment results reflect the contract management key process 
areas— “troops’ contribution planning,” “bid/no-bid decision,” “proposal preparation,” 
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closeout”—were all assessed at a “Structured to Optimized” maturity level. These 
assessment results revealed that basic TCC contract management processes are 
formal, documented and are standardized, institutionalized and mandated for key 
process areas. Additionally, this maturity level reflects each TCC’s flexibility in 
tailoring its contract management processes.  
The following sections highlight specific activities for each of these contract 
management key process areas that the TCCs should focus on to increase the 
maturity level of these contract management processes. 
a. Troops’ Contribution Planning   
The survey assessment results indicate the TCCs’ troops’ contribution 
planning key process area was rated mostly at the “Structured” level. Thus, the 
TCCs provide specific and focused troops’ contribution planning to integrate the 
mission planning processes with other organizational process—such as deployment, 
financial management, mission management, logistic sustenance, security 
management and risk management.  
Since in troops’ contribution planning, most of the TCCs are in “Structured” 
level of maturity, in order to move to next higher level of contract management 
maturity, i.e., “Integrated,” they need to integrate the personnel deployed in the field 
in its planning process. The countries also need to be integrated with other planning 
processes, such as timely deployment and mission management in respect of 
finance, security and risk. The management also needs to use efficiency and 
effectiveness metrics to make troops’ contribution-planning-related decisions. 
b. Bid/No-bid Decision   
The survey assessment results indicate the TCCs’ bid/no-bid decision key 
process area was rated between the “Structured and Optimized” levels. Their 
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In bid/no-bid decision-making, TCCs with “Optimized” level should continue to 
maintain the same level. However, TCCs in “Structured” level of maturity, in order to 
move to next higher level, i.e., “Integrated,” need to integrate their core processes, 
such as schedule and performance management, into decision-making. Their 
management also needs to use efficiency and effectiveness metrics to make bid/no-
bid-related decisions. 
c. Proposal Preparation   
The survey assessment results indicate the TCCs’ proposal preparation key 
process area was rated between the “Optimized and Structured” levels. The TCCs’ 
proposal preparation process is specific and focused, considering the FGS’s unique 
requirement. It is integrated with other activities of the management process, such 
as mission management, security management, logistics sustenance, financial 
management and risk management. 
In proposal preparation, the TCCs with “Optimized” level should maintain the 
same level. However, the TCCs in “Structured” level of maturity, in order to move to 
next higher level, i.e., “Integrated,” need to integrate their core processes—such as 
cost, schedule and performance management in proposal preparation. Their 
management also needs to use efficiency and effectiveness metrics to make 
proposal-preparation-related decisions. 
d. Contract Negotiation & Formation   
Based on survey assessment results, the contract negotiation and formation 
key process area was rated at the “Structured” level—except for TCC Sweden, 
which was rated at the “Integrated” level of maturity. This assessment revealed that 
the TCCs’ contract negotiation and formation processes are standardized and 
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In contract negotiation and formation, “Structured” was the lowest level of 
maturity found among surveyed TCCs. Thus, in order to move to next higher level, 
i.e., “Integrated,” they need to integrate their core processes such as cost, schedule 
and performance management in contract negotiation and formation. Their 
management also needs to use efficiency and effectiveness metrics to make 
contract negotiation- and formation-related decisions. 
e. Contract Administration   
The survey assessment results of the TCCs’ contract administration key 
process area were rated between “Structured and Optimized” levels. This 
assessment revealed that the TCCs’ contract administration process is well 
standardized, documented and usually followed. All concerned personnel are well 
aware of their responsibilities, and periodic performance evaluations are conducted. 
TCCs’ always follow alternative dispute resolution for resolving any issue related to 
contract with the UNDPKO.  
In contract administration, TCCs with “Optimized” level should continue to 
maintain the same level. However, TCCs in “Structured” level of maturity, in order to 
move to next higher level, i.e., “Integrated,” need to integrate their core processes, 
such as cost, schedule and mission performance management, in contract 
administration. Their management also needs to use efficiency and effectiveness 
metrics to make contract-administration-related decisions. 
f. Contract Closeout   
The survey assessment results of the TCCs’ contract closeout key process 
area were rated between “Structured and Optimized” levels. Almost all of the TCCs’ 
contract closeout processes are well documented, involving checklists, templates 
and standard forms. However, nothing is automated. The TCCs follow established 
processes for exercising their right with the UNDPKO to discontinue a mission 
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evaluations of the contract closeout process and use lessons learned and best 
practices for use in future missions.  
In contract closeout, the TCCs with “Optimized” levels should endeavor to 
maintain the same level. However, the TCCs in the “Structured” level of maturity, in 
order to move to the “Integrated” level, need to integrate their core processes such 
as cost, schedule and mission performance management in contract closeout. Their 
management also needs to use efficiency and effectiveness metrics to make 
contract-closeout-related decisions. 
As seen from this analysis, the CMMM and CMMAT provide a wealth of 
information about the TCCs’ contract management processes for providing 
peacekeeping operations/services. Although the assessment offers organizational 
insight on the level of contract management maturity of TCCs in general, it has 
inherent limitations. The research and analysis was based on survey only, and there 
were no physical visits to mission areas or to the participating countries. Over 115 
TCCs participate or have participated in UN peacekeeping operations (UN, 2007b). 
This research included the participation of just four TCCs. Hence, the results project 
higher levels of contract management maturity. However, considering the 
uniqueness of UN peacekeeping operations, the existing system works well for most 
TCCs. Using the CMMM and CMMAT, with its key process areas and key practice 
activities, the TCCs can focus on improving their contract management processes.   
G. SUMMARY  
In this chapter, the evaluation of contract management processes in the UN 
for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services was discussed. The chapter first 
introduced the contract management maturity and discussed the selection of the 
Contract Management Maturity Model developed.  Thereafter, the chapter carried 
out the organizational assessment of study participants, applied the CMMM to the 
FGS and TCCs and analyzed the assessment result to ascertain the contract 
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operations/services. Lastly, this chapter discussed how the CMMM could be used to 
improve the FGS and TCCs’ contract management process. The next chapter 
provides research conclusions, highlights the research implications and provides 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the evaluation of the contract management process 
in the UN for acquiring peacekeeping operations/services was discussed. This 
chapter provides research conclusions, highlights the research implications and 
provides suggestions for future research. 
B. SUMMARY 
The success of peacekeeping operations continues to depend to a significant 
degree on the UN’s ability to acquire and deploy necessary uniformed and civilian 
personnel, and to deploy them rapidly. All acquiring and deployment of troops for 
peacekeeping operations is done via a MOU/LOA. The FGS of the UNDPKO is 
responsible for the overall management of the contract management process. A 
brief background of the UN peacekeeping process was provided in Chapter I to 
facilitate the readers’ understanding of the UN acquisition process. After that, the 
contract management process for acquiring peacekeeping operations was described 
and analyzed. It was revealed that a generic process is followed more or less 
universally for almost all peacekeeping operation planning and operations/services 
acquisition. The planning process is not always followed as laid out, due to certain 
limitations like political consideration, security and threat scenarios and the flexibility 
of the UN and its member countries.  
Thereafter, the CMMM and CMMAT was applied to both the FGS and TCCs 
to assess their respective contract management process maturity. The CMMM has 
five levels of maturity: “ad-hoc,” “basic,” “structured,” “integrated” and “optimized.” 
The contract management process was divided into six key process areas both for 
the FGS and TCCs as a method of understanding their contract management 
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solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration and 
contract close-out. The key process areas of the TCCs are troops’ contribution 
planning, bid/no-bid decision, proposal preparation, contract negotiation and 
formation, contract administration and contract closeout. The available CMMAT was 
tailored to fit both the FGS and the TCCs’ contract management process analysis. 
The CMMAT used a self-administered survey containing 10 specifically developed 
statements related to each of the six contract management key process areas and 
key process activities. The survey response options chosen by the respondents for 
each item were used to determine the level of process capability maturity for that 
specific aspect of the contract management process. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The application of CMMM and its subsequent analysis determined both FGS 
and TCC’s overall contract management maturity level. For the FGS, the maturity 
level was found between “Basic to Optimized,” where contract management key 
process area source selection was found in the “Basic” level of maturity. The 
analysis also highlighted the drawbacks in various areas of the UN contract 
management process, particularly in source selection, identified the FGS’s 
knowledge deficiencies and provided a guideline for contract management process 
improvement. To analyze the contract management process of the TCCs, initially 
seven TCCs were identified, three leading troops’ contributors (namely Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and India) and four traditional well-reputed troops’ contributors (namely 
Sweden, Ghana, Jordan and Uruguay). Out of these seven TCCs, CMMM could be 
applied to four TCCs only (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sweden and Jordan), as no 
response was received from Permanent Missions of India, Ghana and Uruguay to 
the UN. Based on the TCC survey responses, the assessment results reflect the 
contract management key process areas (i.e., pre-contract activities, bid/no-bid 
decision, proposal preparation, contract negotiation and formation, contract 
administration and contract closeout) were all assessed between “Structured and 
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management processes of almost all TCCs are formal and documented, and it is 
standardized, institutionalized and mandated for these key process areas. 
Additionally, this maturity level reflects the TCCs’ flexibility in tailoring this contract 
management process in consideration of the uniqueness of each mission.  
The contract management process in the UNDPKO for acquiring 
peacekeeping operations/services and the contract management process followed 
by the TCCs as providers are unique in nature. Some of the key process areas 
follow the universal contract management process, and some follow unique and 
tailored contract management processes. Despite having certain limitations in the 
present context, the contract management process followed by both the FGS and 
the TCCs for peacekeeping operations/services works satisfactorily. 
D. RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
This research focused on evaluation of contract management processes 
using CMMM and CMMAT. The model was developed with the intention of 
evaluating US Air Force and US Department of Defense’s contract management 
process. Therefore, the CMMAT was developed keeping those contracts in mind. 
Though the survey statements were tailored to fit the FGS and TCC’s contract 
management process, it still contained default limitations. Another significant 
limitation was the participation from the TCC’s permanent mission representatives in 
the UN. Out of initially planned seven TCCs, only four TCCs could be surveyed and 
analyzed. Since these TCCs are leading TCCs, the assessment results portray 
higher contract management maturity level. Another limitation of the study is the 
expectation of the evaluation. The purpose of this study was to identify the 
UNDPKO’s contract management process, its maturity level in key contract 
management process areas and to identify weaknesses, not to provide the solutions. 
The FGS and TCCs can all use these findings to identify their weaknesses and 
limitations in key contract management process areas and to develop a road map for 
continuous process improvement. Finally, the application of the CMMM and CMMAT 
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this study, the researcher conducted a site visit to the UNDPKO only. No visit was 
conducted to any TCC or mission area due to time and resource constraints. Though 
the analysis of the FGS’s contract management process was based on first-hand 
data and information received from the UNDPKO, the analysis of the TCCs is solely 
based on the results of a self-administered assessment survey by a limited number 
of respondents, on interviews of key personnel, and the research available in 
websites, books, journals and manuals.  
E. RECOMMENDATION 
Since contract management processes are critical enablers of successful 
peacekeeping operations, the assessment results may be used by the FGS and the 
TCCs as a guide for improving their contract management process for acquiring 
peacekeeping operations/services. Each of the FGS and TCCs may target a level of 
maturity they would like to achieve, develop appropriate action plans and prepare 
performance metrics for achieving desired maturity level.  
F. FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research only identified the contract management process maturity in 
key process areas of both the FGS and the TCCs. It did not provide solutions to the 
shortcomings that were identified. Future research may be carried out to evaluate 
the contract management process of additional TCCs to get more data on TCCs’ 
contract management process maturity. Additional research should be conducted to 
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